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Introduction 
W hat is "information warfare"? Is it nothing more than a bumper sticker, used as a "quick fix" rescue for budgets and programs that 
find it useful to attach themselves to the hot new concept? Is it such a revolu-
tionary new amalgam of technologies and concepts that old and traditional 
forms of warfare are soon slated to fall into the same receptacle in which out-
moded military technologies such as the catapult and war galley slumber? Is 
warfare as we understand it, featuring "blast, heat, and fragmentation," about to 
become obsolete?1 The intent of this brief introduction to information warfare 
(IW) and information operations (10) is to both explore these issues and present 
the thesis that they are best understood in light of the environment in which 
they take place-the information environment-and to explore the relation-
ship of that environment to the specific topic on which this book is focused, 
computer network attack. 
Information Operations, Inforntation Warfare, and Computer Network Attack 
What is Information Warfare? 
A useful starting place is to trace the evolution of the term information 
warfare itsel£ The earliest use of the term in the United States probably origi-
nated in the Office of Net Assessment, where in the 1970s Dr. Tom Rona was 
investigating the relationships among control systems, a field known as cyber-
netics. Dr. Rona described the competition between competing control systems 
as "information warfare," in the sense that control systems can be described as 
the means for gathering, processing, and disseminating information, processes 
which can be diagrammed and described with flow and feedback charts of 
mind-numbing dryness and complexity.2 In 1993 the Department of Defense 
published an official definition for the term, in a highly classified DoD Directive, 
TS3600.1. There were actually several definitions, at differing levels of classifi-
cation.3 Not surprisingly, this definition was frequently revised as the opera-
tional and organizational implications of the concept evolved. The current 
definition has the record for longevity-more than five years at the time of this 
writing, since the promulgation of the current guidance on information warfare 
and information operations in DoD Directive 3600.1 on December 9, 1996.4 
The publication of Joint Publication 3-13,Joint Doctrine for Information Op-
erations, in October 1998 probably ensures that the current official DoD defini-
tions ofIW and 10 will remain in effect for some time longer.s 
The present definitions leave much to be desired, however, if one is hoping to 
find explanations that clarify and explore what might constitute the character, 
conduct, and intent ofIW and 10. But since one must understand what 10 is in 
order to move to its less comprehensive building block, IW, these definitions do 
provide a useful starting point: 
Infonnation Operations: Actions taken to affect adversary infonnation and infonnation 
systems while defending one's own infonnation and infonnation systems. 
Infonnation Warfare: Infonnation operations conducted during time of crisis or 
conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or 
adversaries. 
There is actually a second sub-activity ofIO that is critical to national security in 
the Information Age, namely information assurance (IA), defined thus: 
Information Assurance: Information operations that protect and defend 
information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, 
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authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes providing for 
restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and 
reaction capabilities.6 
While these definitions throw a less-than-blinding light on their constituent 
activities, there is one critical theme that they are intended to bring out, and 
that involves "who" does them and "when" they are done. IW is clearly a mil-
itary activity conducted under a special set of circumstances, whereas IA in-
volves not only the military, but also government at all levels, and even 
portions of the private sector. Therefore, 10 as an activity goes far beyond just 
the military during conflict, to include the government and a wider range of 
private sector activities than perhaps that sector or even the government 
recognizes. 
Most US service concepts ofIW rest in part on the concept of the "informa-
tion environment." Whether described as an environment, realm, domain, or 
whatever, there is a clear sense that information has become some kind of 
"place" in which crucial operations are conducted. The Army's trailblazing 
1996 doctrinal publication, Field Manual 1 00-6, Information Operations, even 
speaks of a "global information environment [and] battlespace" in which con-
flict is waged. The latest version of the USAF's basic doctrinal publication, Air 
Force Doctrine Document 1, published in 1997, explicitly addresses the need to 
dominate the information realm, and discusses information superiority as "the 
ability to collect, control, exploit, and defend information while denying an ad-
versary the ability to do the same ... [it] includes gaining control over the infor-
mation realm .... "7 Joint Pub 3-13 defines it somewhat differently as "[t]he 
capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of inform a-
tion while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same." Both, 
however, share the sense that information superiority involves doing something 
to the adversary while protecting ourselves in order to control and exploit the 
information environment. Using this philosophy, then, IW and 10 can be de-
scribed as the struggle to control and exploit the information environment, a struggle 
that extends across the conflict spectrum from "peace" to "war" and involves 
virtually all of the government's agencies and instruments of power.8 One appeal 
of this approach is that if one replaces "information" with "aerospace" or "mari-
time," you have defined air and naval warfare, or more appropriate to our pur-
poses, airpower and seapower. Information operations can thus be described as 
those activities that governments and military forces undertake to control and 
exploit the information environment via the use of the information component 
of national power. 
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This immediately raises another question: what is the information compo-
nent of national power? More than just another bit of computer-age termino-
logical fluff, its origins actually predate this decade, starting with the strategies 
developed by the Reagan Administration in its very real struggle with the for-
mer USSR. In 1984 the Reagan Administration issued National Security Deci-
sion Directive 130, US International Information Policy, which outlined a 
strategy for employing the use of information and information technology as 
strategic instruments for shaping fundamental political, economic, military, and 
cultural forces on a long-term basis to affect the global behavior of governments, 
supra-governmental organizations, and societies to support national security.9 
This is hardly a new concept, and clearly governments and leaders have been ex-
ploiting the information environment for centuries. Indeed, one could argue 
that the stone carvings that Assyrian rulers made of conquered peoples and cities 
being enslaved and pillaged were intended as much to cow and terrify current 
and potential subjects as to inform archeologists thousands of years later about 
what hard and cruel folks they were. Regardless of the fact that the information 
technology being employed was stone and chisel, and not microchip and com-
puter network, this was exploitation of the information environment for strate-
gic political objectives. 
Two examples from this century will suffice to illustrate the critical impor-
tance of this environment to national security. The first took place on August 5, 
1914, when the royal cableship Telconia sortied into the North Sea and severed 
all five of Germany's direct undersea telegraph links with the outside world. 
After that date, the view that the rest of the world had of The Great War in-
creasingly passed through a lens located in London. This enabled British infor-
mation warriors to mount a very effective strategic perception management 
campaign that eventually helped bring the United States into the war on the 
side of the Allies, thus moving from strict neutrality to waging war to "make the 
world safe for democracy." Great Britain was e}.-ploiting the information com-
ponent of national power. The second example comes from the Cold War and 
the efforts by the United States and some of its allies to e}.-ploit another segment 
of the information environment-radio-to weaken the political cohesion of 
the Soviet Union and the peoples it controlled. Radio Free Europe did not by 
itself, of course, cause the fall of communism and the Soviet government, but it 
certainly had its role to play. It is perhaps instructive that certain elements 
within the former Soviet Union still blame Western 10 for communism's col-
lapse.10 Yet since both these examples employed old information technolo-
gies-telegraph cables and radio-they also beg the question: what is the role of 
the computer in all of this? 
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A New Geostrategic Context 
The previous examples raise the question of what is so new and different 
about the current state of the "infonnation environment" to warrant all the fuss 
about" computer network attack" and information warfare. The answer is four-
fold: cyberspace, digital convergence, global digital omni-linking, and com-
puter control of infrastructures, all of which are synergistically combining to 
create a new geostrategic context for national security. 
One's receptivity to the changes of the infonnation revolution is often re-
vealed by the reaction to the word "cyberspace." At the very utterance of the 
word, doubters and skeptics display intellectual and sometimes even physical 
discomfort, while the "digerati" and those at ease with the technologies of the 
infonnation age react as if someone had said "traffic" or "radio" or any other 
commonplace tenn. Almost everyone is familiar with the use ofinfonnation as a 
tool, a process, even a weapon-recall the earlier comment about "blast, heat, 
and fragmentation"-yet while all of these remain not only applicable but even 
vital to the new and evolving "American way of war," none in isolation goes far 
enough. This chapter argues that the synergistic effects of electronic digital tech-
nology, acting in and on societies that are becoming increasingly infonnation-
dependent, have made infonnation into a virtual environment, with cyberspace 
as its physical manifestation. Cyberspace, defined here as that place where elec-
tronic systems such as computer networks, telecommunications systems, and 
devices that exert their influence through or in the electromagnetic spectrum 
connect and interact, has always existed, but not until mankind invented tech-
nologies that operated via the electromagnetic spectrum did it become "visible" 
and noticed.11 A useful analogy is outer space. It has always been there, but not 
until humans developed technologies for extending our activities into it and 
used it to affect terrestrial affairs did we fully comprehend that it is another physi-
cal and operational environment in addition to the land, sea, and air. Outer space 
does not have the same physical presence or properties ofland or water because 
you cannot "weigh" it or "measure" it in a useful sense, but it nonetheless exists 
because we can see the physical results of things that happen there.12 
The physical laws and principles that govern and delineate how systems func-
tion in these environments are the borders that fix their boundaries.13 Subma-
rines, for example, function very well in an environment governed by the laws 
of hydrodynamics, but they cannot fly. Annored fighting vehicles function ef-
fectively on land, but they are useless in space. All of these distinct and unique 
environments synergistically interact with each other, and the same holds true 
for cyberspace. The devices and systems that operate in cyberspace-radios, 
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radars, microwaves, computer networks-function because they conform to 
and exploit the laws governing radiated and electronic energy. We can date our 
use of this environment to the mid-19th Century and the invention of the tele-
graph, which was the first telecommunication system to operate in accordance 
with the laws of this medium. I4 The following century saw regular and 
ever-more technologically sophisticated advances in our ability to control and 
exploit this medium-undersea telegraph cables, radio, television, microwave 
relay, even communications satellites-that extended the reach oftelecommu-
nications to continental and eventually intercontinental distances. We have in-
creased the volume of information that we can store, manipulate, and transfer to 
previously unimaginable proportions, but it was only in the closing quarter of 
the 20th Century that the fortuitous, perhaps even serendipitous, marriage of 
these technologies with the microchip led to attainment of "critical mass" and 
the emergence of cyberspace as a full fledged environment in which military 
forces and society in general-politics, business, education, and more-began to 
learn how to operate. Given this definition of cyberspace, we see the link to 
computer network attack; cyberspace is the physical environment in which such 
operations take place. 
Cyberspace is the basic arena in which two additional developments of the in-
formation revolution are transforming the strategic landscape: the increasing ca-
pability to transform almost any kind of information into ones and zeroes, in 
what is known as digital convergence, and the grO\ving Internetting of global tele-
communications media in a condition referred to here as global ol1l11i-linkillg. Al-
though these developments are distincdy different, they are at the same time 
synergistic and interdependent. Thomas Kuhn suggested in his landmark study 
of scientific revolutions that the history of technological advancement has not 
been one of steady discoveries or developments, but rather one marked by spikes 
or sharp advances that flow from extraordinary finds or revelations that yield dis-
continuous and revolutionary changes. IS Such has been the case \vith informa-
tion technology. Advances in communication technologies prior to the middle 
of the 20th Century were relatively linear-telegraph to telephone to radio and 
so forth. The break point came with the invention of the microchip because the 
synergistic advances in information storage, manipulation, and transmission ca-
pabilities made possible by digital convergence are happening at an ever-
increasing and nonlinear rate. These developments have occurred in two areas, 
the speed ofinformation manipulation/transmission, and the volume of inform a-
tion that can be manipulated/transmitted. The combination of these attributes 
with computer-enhanced and controlled telecommunications systems have led 
to the "omni-linking"·ofthe electronic digital world. In a word, the globe is now 
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"wired." The explosion that has resulted from the application of the microchip 
to communications technologies has formed the new science of telematics-the 
marriage of computers and telecommunications. 
Telematics has created a new operational environment. The technology of 
the telematic age we use to exploit cyberspace is new, perhaps less than two de-
cades old, and global omni-linking is inseparably tied to the emergence of 
cyberspace as an operational environment. While current technology is actually 
rudimentary compared with what the future holds in store-compare the level 
of aviation technology in the 1930s (biplanes) with what came just half a century 
later (747s and B-2s)-the omnilinking of the world is increasing every day, as 
more and more computer networks and telecommunications systems tie to-
gether and pass the lifeblood oftoday's economic and political world ... digital 
information. The degree to which our societal dependence on this environment 
is growing is startling. Our military forces already depend on it. The Persian Gulf 
War of 1990-91 simply could not have been fought in the way we fought it 
without precision information for precision weapons, command and control 
systems that enabled us to operate like a matador around a woozy and 
half-conscious bull, or satellite communications links that enabled organizations 
half a world away (NORAD) to monitor Iraqi missile launches and pass target-
ing information to Patriot batteries to engage the missiles.16 Our micro-
chip-driven information collection, storage, manipulation, and transmission 
capabilities are so advanced, and the links that move the information around so 
Internetted, that we worry that TV news commentators on the east coast could 
skew election results on the west coast by announcing '.'analysis of voting trends 
indicate candidate 'Z' has won the election." The global economy cannot func-
tion without the constant supply of digital electronic information. It has become 
a form of energy or capital, and global business is utterly dependent on telematic 
systems and capabilities to keep the world's economy going twenty-four hours a 
day. Business practices such as ':iust in time inventory," or military techniques 
such as ':iust in time logistics," cannot function without the digital information 
that fuels it. In a very real sense, Joint Vision 2010,17 which could be called the 
"new American way of war," is possible only if American forces possess "infor-
mation superiority," defined by Joint Pub 3-13 as "[t]he capability to collect, 
process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting 
or denying an adversary's ability to do the same." The "Internet" is neither a fi-
nite place nor a collection of gadgets such as routers and switches; it is a descrip-
tion of the increasing omni-linking of the world. Thinking of the Internet in 
terms ofits users, such as "America OnLine" or "CompuServe," or in terms of 
uses, such as chat rooms or E-commerce, is as shortsighted as describing 
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aerospace in terms of an airline. While some dismiss this environment and the 
Internet as merely entertainment or worse, this view ignores the fact that a very 
large percentage of the information currently available on TV or in print would 
fall into the same category. Few, however, would deny the impact of visual me-
dia on the American populace's support of the Vietnam War or the impact of the 
printed word on democracy and freedom via the "Declaration of Independ-
ence" or "Emancipation Proclamation." What is different is that the Internet 
and omni-linking make it increasingly possible for that televised image to be 
seen instantly by an ever increasing percentage of the world's population, or for 
that opinion-shaping paper to be sent to tens or even hundreds of millions of 
people simultaneously and in their own language.1s Digital convergence, com-
bined with connectivity, adds up to the second major part of the fundamental 
difference between the information age and the period "BMC"-"Before the 
Micro Chip." 
The final major development shaping the new geostrategic context is the 
increasing reliance on computerized networks for the control and operation 
of key infrastructures in advanced societies. The growing reliance on these 
systems for the control and functioning of an increasingly large segment of the 
infrastructures on which we depend for economic, social, political, and even 
military strength is both a boon and vulnerability. As suggested by Chairman 
of the Joint ChiefS of Staff Instruction (C]CSI) 6510.1, Defensive Informa-
tion Warfare, "use breeds dependence, and dependence creates vulnerabil-
ity."19 Whether it be the supply of energy (electricity, oil, gas), the manage-
ment of transportation (railroads, air traffic control, motor vehicle move-
ment), the transference of digital wealth (electronic funds transfer, digital 
banking, control of stock exchanges), or the operation of the very telematic 
media that supports the entire structure, look below the surface of almost any 
segment of daily life in modem societies and one will find Internetted and 
interlinked computer systems.20 
The degree to which this is invisible to the general populace is illustrated by a 
real incident. In February 1996, Washington DC suffered a tragic but relatively 
typical industrial-age accident-a train wreck. During a snowstorm a commuter 
train collided with a freight train, and several people were killed. The investiga-
tions by the news media examined almost every aspect of the accident, including 
the signaling system that provided instructions to the train operator (who was 
also killed, heroically trying to warn passengers instead of saving himself) via the 
ubiquitous signal lights that line railroad tracks all over the world. The news me-
dia focused on whether the operator saw the signals, whether they were properly 
placed, or whether they functioned properly. None asked whether the signals 
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had been electronically tampered with (they had not been), nor even raised the 
issue of how the signals were controlled or where those controls were located. 
They were controlled, of course, by Intemetted computer systems, and the 
computers which control the rail signals for the trackage in Washington DC are 
located at the operations center for CSXRailways, in Jacksonville, Florida, sev-
eral hundred miles distant. This is an illustration of how deeply imbedded within 
modem societies such control systems have become, and how unaware most of 
us are of their functioning.21 
It is a government responsibility, however, to not only be aware of such de-
velopments, but also to take precautionary and preventive measures to mitigate 
potential disruptions to the effective functioning of systems upon which the so-
ciety and national security depend. InJuly 1996, the Clinton Administration is-
sued Executive Order 13010, which directed the fonnation of a unique 
commission, the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, 
or PCCIP, which brought together senior governmental officials and represen-
tatives from those private sector industries and businesses that comprised these 
key infrastructures into a commission tasked with studying the vulnerability of 
these infrastructures to disruption. While the commission examined both the 
physical and cyber threats, they freely acknowledged that their emphasis was on 
the cyber threat, in part because it was-and remains-less well understood than 
physical threats. Their conclusion that the threat is real and growing might seem 
unsurprising and perhaps even preordained, but nonetheless reflects the grow-
ing awareness that our very dependency on computerized control ofinfrastruc-
tures creates an inherent vulnerability that is at the heart of hypothetical 
scenarios for infonnation warfare in which computer network attacks on critical 
infrastructures "take down" key segments of those infrastructures and thus gen-
erate cascading effects on such systems as transportation, banking, or emergency 
services. It was the need to respond to this vulnerability that caused the Clinton 
Administration to issue Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63 on May 22, 
1998, establishing a national coordinator for infrastructure protection within the 
National Security Council and creating an organizational structure by which 
such threats and vulnerabilities could be mitigated. PDD 63 called for a public 
sector-private sector partnership to develop cooperative procedures and organi-
zations to assess the threats and vulnerabilities and create countenneasures, and 
thus stands as a landmark step in what is now called computer network defense 
(CND) against the threat of what has in some quarters been tenned 
"infrastructural warfare" employing computer network attack (CNA).22 But as 
perhaps the key element in infonnation warfare, is the computer network the 
target, or merely the means to the target? 
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Computer Networks, National Security, and the "Metanetwork" 
This chapter has already used several tenus relating to computer networks 
without defining those activities. The current ClCSI 3210.1,Joint Information 
Operations Policy, dated November 6, 1998, currently includes three such 
activities, defined thus: 
Computer Netw'Ork Attack (CNA): Operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or 
destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the 
computers and networks themselves. 
Computer Network Defense (CND): Measures taken to protect and defend 
information, computers, and networks from disruption, denial, degradation, or 
destruction. 
Computer Network E},."ploitation (CNE): Intelligence collection operations that 
obtain information resident in files of threat automated information systems (AIS) 
and gain information about potential vulnerabilities, or access critical information 
resident within foreign AIS that could be used to the benefit of friendly 
operations.23 
The thread that ties these activities together is the computer network. The 
network may be the actual target, in the sense that the attacker \vishes to make 
the network cease its function of transferring information. It may be the 
means to affect another target, such as a database or other information-based 
process, in which the attacker does not want to cut the network, but rather 
use it in order to impact or degrade an adversary's decision-making process. 
The objective of computer network defense is to prevent an adversary from 
doing either of these to our networks. Computer network exploitation is spe-
cifically concerned with intelligence operations. While the dividing line be-
tween CNA and CNE may well be very murky-indeed, a single keystroke 
might be the only difference-we will not discuss CNE or even eND fur-
ther, in part because those operations bring along their own baggage train of 
thorny issues and unresolved questions. CNA will be a sufficiently difficult 
problem to address here. 
Imagine for a moment that a warrior (the specific service or warform is irrele-
vant) has just destroyed a critical target, comprised of all the computerized data-
bases contained in the enemy's central C3 facility. Does it matter if this was done 
with a laser-guided aerial bomb, a five-inch round from a warship at sea, a 
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120mm round from a tank, a ballistic weapon dropped from space, or via mali-
cious programming code "delivered" by computer intrusion? The definition of 
CNA cited above does not clearly state the answer, but it is this author's conten-
tion that the means used is immaterial; since the intent clearly conforms to the 
spirit of the definition, any or all of the examples just cited could be CNA. In all 
but the last case, however, warriors and jurists alike probably consider them-
selves to be on fairly firm ground. It is the last case that gives everyone pause. In 
part, this comes from our intellectual and doctrinal desire for clarity. Warriors 
seek to clearly distinguish between different kinds of operations so that they can 
establish clear lines of authority and control. Unfortunately, this may not be fully 
possible in the information battlespace. The example cited above could be air, 
naval, land, or space warfare, in addition to being information warfare. This is 
not unique to information warfare, although we do not often examine military 
operations from such a multi-doctrinal perspective. During the October 1973 
Yom Kippur War, for example, once Israeli armored forces crossed the Suez Ca-
nal in their counteroffensive they began destroying Egyptian surface-to-air mis-
sile forces, which enabled the Israeli Air Force to expand operations. This is a 
wonderful example of what airmen term Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses, or 
SEAD. Doctrinally, SEAD is a part of what is in tum called Counterair Opera-
tions-things done to seize and maintain control of the air. Thus, armored forces 
were part of an air superiority operation at the same time they were engaging in 
what ground forces would call maneuver warfare. This same kind of doctrinal flexi-
bility must also be applied to information warfare and CNA. 
The first aspect of CNA mentioned above focused on the destruction or ne-
gation of a network. Regardless of whether this is accomplished kinetically-the 
laser guided bomb, for example-or via cyberspace, the intent remains the same, 
to prevent the adversary's use of the network. We will not consider kinetic 
means further, since they are already well understood, but the use of the com-
puter to negate another computer is less well understood. There is no need here 
to discuss the intricacies and details of computer code, and such issues are ad-
dressed in great detail in a myriad of books on computer security and informa-
tion technology. That said, a word or two on the basic context are in order.24 
The basic objective of virtually any computer intruder or hacker is to be able to 
operate ,vithin the system as ifhe/she owned it. Once this level of access is 
gained, the pseudo-owner can then change programs, functions, addresses, and 
almost any other aspect of the way the computer or the entire network in which 
it resides operates. Thus, an intruder that obtains root access into a computer 
network that controls personnel records, for example, could perhaps alter the 
content of those records or change how those records are stored or transferred. 
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The implications of this for the proper functioning of any computer network, be 
it military, government, or business, are obvious. 
As pointed out earlier, modem technologically advanced societies are in-
creasingly dependent on computer networks for a growing range of societal and 
national security needs. If the computer system that controls rail operations in 
the southeast United States can be degraded, for example, it will slow down or 
perhaps even stop the movement of military forces that depend on rail links to 
move to their deployment locations. If the telephone system that supports Scott 
Air Force Base, headquarters of US Transportation Command, Air Mobility 
Command, and the Tanker-Airlift Coordination Center, can be severely de-
graded it could seriously hinder the movement of US forces overseas. If the en-
ergy management system (electric, gas, and oil) in the northeast could be 
degraded during severe winter weather it might cause a refocusing of national 
political and strategic attention away from a distant and perhaps poorly-
understood overseas problem to an unfolding disaster right at home. Some of the 
discussion ofinfrastructural vulnerability seen recently has given far too little credit 
to the resiliency and robustness of these networks. However, while loose talk of 
"taking down" entire national infrastructures is fanciful at best, it also remains true 
that all of these infrastructures are in some degree vulnerable to intrusion and deg-
radation. Examples as recent as the 1999 Kosovo conflict, during which a variety 
of allied computer networks such as the NATO e-mail system came under attack 
via what was a "denial of service" effort to overload the system with electronic 
traffic, indicate that this will be an active battlespace in the future.25 
If the intent of a CNA is to partially or completely deny access to or use of the 
network, defenders are faced with a thorny set of problems, but at least they will 
probably be aware that the system has been targeted. When you receive multiple 
thousands of unanticipated e-mail messages within a short span of time in what is 
termed'a "spam" or denial of service attack, you can reasonably assume that 
someone-even though you might not know whom-means you harm. CNA 
that does not attempt to overtly prevent use of the system, however, but rather is 
intended to covertly subvert its purpose by changing the content, is perhaps an 
even more difficult problem. Let us use the analogy of a pipeline that is carrying 
jet fuel. In traditional, kinetic warfare, we would target it for destruction from 
the air, and a smart airplane carrying PGMs would come along and neatly blow 
the thing apart, thus preventing the enemy from refueling his jets from it. But 
what if we did not want to be so noisy? We could send a special operations unit 
to the pipeline, attach to it a small pumping device that injects a small but fatal 
(from a jet fuel standpoint, atleast) amount of some nasty foreign substance, and, 
even though the pipeline itselfis still intact, render the stuff flowing through the 
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pipeline unusable. It is a perfect analogy for digital modification of data, and it 
might be virtually invisible until too late. Let us assume that the computer code 
for "bomb, 500 pound" is a combination offorty-four ones and zeros, while the 
code for "bomb, 4,000 pound" is another combination of forty-four ones and 
zeroes-almost, but not quite, identical. The opportunity for logistical chaos is 
immediately apparent. If one eighth the anticipated number of munitions show 
up at Base X, but all of them are too large for the aircraft at that base to carry, 
some significant friction has just been il1iected into the air war. We have a long 
history of instances where accidental but incorrect computer code in systems 
that deal \vith telecommunications or energy has caused significant malfunctions 
\vith those systems, and we have seen a growing number of cases of intentional 
intrusion into these and other such computer networks.26 
The mindset of many senior strategic leaders regarding the computer still 
seems to be that they are large, expensive, and stand alone in their respective 
"data center" somewhere. The reality is just the opposite-for they are small 
(and getting smaller every week), cheap (and getting cheaper every week), and 
interconnected on a global scale. It can be a difficult realization that if you oper-
ate a computer that is plugged into a telephone, you are theoretically connected 
to every other computer on the face of the earth that is also connected to a tele-
phone, even if it is a cell phone-hence the strategic importance of what this 
chapter calls "omni-linking," because the globe is literally covered with count-
less individual computer networks that are nonetheless all part of the growing 
global "metanetwork" to which tens of millions of individuals, organizations, 
and entire societies are connected. It would seem to be inescapable that as more 
and more human activity is conducted in cyberspace via the metanetwork, it will 
become a battlespace and an arena for conflict. But will it be war? 
Information Warfare-Is it ''War''? 
Perhaps a necessary starting point for this question is: what is war? Most mem-
bers of the military and the national security community would have no diffi-
culty recognizing Clause\vitz's characterization of war as "an act of [physical] 
force ... a pulsation ofviolence."27 Too often, perhaps, the rest of the phrase, 
"to impose our will," is forgotten. The reason for the force and violence is the 
imposition of the will of one political entity onto another political entity. The is-
sue at hand now is the potential ability of political actors to impose their will 
through informational means. 
In the Clausewitzian paradigm, war was waged by a special class of act~)r5, 
"warriors," on behalf of a special kind of political entity, "States." The warriors 
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were the unifonned military-soldiers, sailors, later ainnen-and the States 
were the legitimate and recognized holders of international legal authority to 
engage in the force and violence of warfare. Almost at the same time Oate 19th 
Century) as the Clausewitzian paradigm began rising to international promi-
nence another force arrived on the scene, the international codification oflegal 
norms for the conduct of war and the protection of certain classes of society. 
These norms, first enacted a century ago (1899) at The Hague, almost immedi-
ately encountered two extremely powerful forces: the nature of the modem in-
dustrial State and the influence of new technological means of warfighting. 
The modem industrial State possessed an unprecedented amount of killing 
and dying power. Although this was clearly hinted at by the course of the Ameri-
can Civil War, the great European military powers failed to recognize it until 
too late.28 The result was the stalemate and slaughter of The Great War and the 
Western Front, in which the amount of destructive force that the industrial State 
could generate was matched only by the amount of destructive force it could 
withstand. Twenty years later these same great powers demonstrated that their 
killing/ dying power had actually increased, with the result that World War II's 
toll far exceeded that ofW orld War 1. This was made possible by the State's abil-
ity to employ and draw upon power sources that cut across almost the full 
breadth of society. These sources crossed the boundaries of what had been in-
tended as sanctuaries and protected groups, such as undefended towns or non-
combatants such as women. But did the concept of an undefended town mean 
anything useful in an era of nationwide air defense systems ,vith flak belts and 
fighter patrols? Was "Rosie the Riveter" a protected person when she and her 
sisters left their homes to build U-boats or liberty ships?29 It became increasingly 
obvious that the modem industrial State was a series of networks or infrastruc-
tures, and the American doctrine for strategic airpower in World War II was 
based on exploiting this fact. The "industrial web" theory of targeting, devel-
oped at the Air Corps Tactical School in the 1930s, came from precisely this par-
adigm and was based on the belief that if the critical nodes or" centers of gravity" 
(a 1990s adaptation of a Clausewitzian tenn) of an industrial State could be ne-
gated, the resulting stresses on the entire system would cause it to unravel like a 
spider's web whose critical connecting points have been cut.30 The result of the 
interplay of these factors was a change in our paradigm of warfare, from the 
"limited" dynastic wars of the 19th Century to the "total" wars of survival-po-
litical, religious, racial, ideological-of the 20th Century. 
A second critical factor was the development of new forms of warfare based 
on the exploitation of new forms of technology. The first great revolution in 
military affairs (RMA) of the last century was the adaptation of the internal 
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combustion engine to warfare, and by the end of the century's second decade 
warfare had become incredibly more complex than it had been in 1900 because 
it was now multidimensional. No longer was warfare waged on the surface. 
Now it went on below the ocean's surface and above both the sea and the land, 
and military success became increasingly dependent on the successful coordina-
tion of operations in all three dimensions. Thus, the invention and employment 
of the submarine and the airplane transformed warfare, a fact that was clearly vis-
ible during World War II in that no nation that failed to dominate all three envi-
ronments was successful. To make the situation more complex, by 1945 it was 
clear that any force that was unable to operate in yet a 4th dimension-the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum, or what has here been defined as cyberspace--would 
have great difficulty operating successfully in any of the other three dimensions. 
This trend has continued and been intensified with military exploitation of yet 
another physical environment, outer space. The strategic and operational envi-
ronment for warfare at the cusp of the new millennium now enfolds geospatial 
awareness, global connectivity, and a host of new factors that have further com-
plicated the art of war. Not surprisingly, the legal context for conflict, which in-
cludes the law of war and the complex series of agreements and treaties that 
provide a framework for the affairs of State and conduct of statecraft, has been 
outpaced by the technologies available to global society. At the outset of the 
20th Century, issues such as unrestricted submarine warfare and strategic bomb-
ing held promise of a disconnect between the law and war, while at its close 
other issues, such as netwar or the weaponization of space, hint at further uncer-
tainty in how States and societies will attempt to regulate conflict. The same two 
forces that arose at the opening of the last century are still at work, with the nota-
ble difference that instead of the industrial age it is the information age that is 
changing the paradigm. 
In some ways, the impact of the information revolution on warfare is quite 
apparent, and the application of advanced information technologies to tradi-
tional military capabilities and weapon systems-what could be termed infor-
mation "in war"-serves to make "blast, heat, and fragmentation" work more 
efficiently and effectively. Information used as a weapon, tool, or even target is 
nothing new, even though the new technologies vastly increase its impact as an 
enabling capability orforce multiplier. Sending target photos via secure fax from 
intelligence organizations in the United States to air campaign planners in 
NATO, thus enabling the destruction shortly afterwards of key Serbian infra-
structure nodes via precision guided munitions, is an example of this fact. This 
e:h-ponential power as an enabler is an important, even vital aspect of what the Air 
Force calls "information in war,"31 a critical foundation for information warfare, 
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but it is not synonymous with it. Information warfare is a new warform that is 
evolving from the synergistic effects of several new and unique factors, all part 
and parcel of the information revolution. 
This brings us back, however, to the entering question: is this "war"? Does 
this fit with the Clausewitzian paradigm offorce and violence? If a State is able to 
degrade an adversary's military capability, damage its key infrastructures, and in-
ject great disorder into political systems or economic affairs, all without the use 
of kinetic force and violence, might not the recipient of such effects argue that 
they had indeed been "attacked" and were thus "at war" with the inflictor? Dur-
ing a recent exercise conducted annually at the Air Force Wargaming Institute 
by students from all of the DoD's senior military colleges, the "red team" devel-
oped a war plan against "blue" that included information warfare attacks against 
such targets as the air traffic control system, financial centers, energy distribution 
network, and telecommunications infrastructure, with the intent of degrading 
and disrupting blue's political will and strategic capability. The red team's objec-
tive was to seriously undermine the ability and will of both blue and its allies to 
continue armed opposition to red's other operations. This exercise in informa-
tion warfare-which the students named "Dangerous Opportunity" -might be 
seen as a mirror-imaging of American attitudes and mindsets, but it also reflects 
technological conditions and vulnerabilities that the information environment 
may make available in any future conflict. It also closely tracks with recent publi-
cations by some senior Chinese officers, who postulated precisely such opera-
tions in their concept for "Unrestricted Warfare."32 But does this perspective 
reflect any sort of consensus on what IW and 10 are? 
Perspectives and Doctrines 
Earlier it was pointed out that the terminology ofIW and 10 are still evolv-
ing; not surprisingly, so are the various operational and doctrinal concepts held 
by the different organizations involved in the IW 110 effort, both in the United 
States and globally. It is worth some time to briefly explore some of these doc-
trinal and operational concepts. In the American military much of the future di-
rection for IW 110 will come from "Joint Vision 2010," published by the Joint 
Staff in 1996, amplified in 1997 by "ExpandingJ oint Vision 2010: Concept for 
Joint Warfare," and further amplified by '']V 2020" in the summer of2000.33 
]V2010, as it is called, postulated several dynamic changes in the overall strategic 
environment and the emergence of new operational concepts. A key hypothesis 
of]V2010 is that dramatic changes in new information technologies will make 
attaining and maintaining information superiority a critical requirement. 
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Concepts such as Dominant Batdespace Awareness or Network Centric War-
fare are based on the assumption that new information technologies will enable 
US forces to develop and exploit networks of sensors, decision-makers, and 
shooters that can operate far faster than their adversaries, and thus translate infor-
mation superiority into actual combat power.34 
If the technologies of the information revolution are creating an information-
based RMA, it remains for the American military to bring this to fruition by cre-
ating organizations, doctrines, and operational concepts to exploit technological 
advantages, and tum them into actual military capability.35 In 1998 the Joint 
Staff finally published Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information 
Operations. Like any such publication, it represents what all of the various coor-
dinating parties could agree on, including the four military services. It is not a vi-
sionary document with radical new operational concepts, but it does emphasize 
that 10 is not a technical capability, but rather a coordinating strategy for opera-
tions in the information environment, and it makes three critical points. First, 
joint forces at all levels must organize to conduct 10, and every one of the com-
batant commands, such as European or Central Command, have created 
full-time planning cells for 10. Next, the 10 planning process must begin long 
before operations begin; it is too late to begin planningjust a few days before the 
operation's scheduled initiation. Finally, joint forces must train and exercise in 
an information-intensive environment and engage all of the applicable organi-
zations, including perhaps private sector or combined-multinational entities. 
All US services-Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force-have 
approached IW 110 somewhat differendy, viewing them through their individ-
ual warfighting lenses. The Army was the first service to publish specific doctrine 
for 10, and Field Manual 100-6, published in 1996, contained eloquent lan-
guage about the "global information environment [and] batdespace," as men-
tioned earlier. But the doctrine's perspective was clearly on the need to 
"integrate all aspects of information to support and enhance the elements of 
combat power," those being the rather traditional: infantry, armor, artillery, 
and, to a lesser extent, airpower delivered via rotary-winged helicopters. The 
Army has chartered an organization, the Land Information Warfare Activity 
(LIW A) at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to develop both concepts and capabilities for 
10, and LIW A personnel have been active in the Balkans for much of the 1990s, 
assisting Army 10 efforts there. The Navy views 10 as something that enables 
fleet operations and makes those operations more efficient and effective. The 
Navy's perspective on 10 also reflects the expertise and experiences of several of 
its different "communities," with two in particular, spacel electronic warfare 
and cryptology, as having special interest and impact on 10. The Navy has two 
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key organizations, the Fleet Information Warfare Center (FIWC) at Little 
Creek, Virginia, and the Naval Information Warfare Agency (NIWA) at Fort 
Meade, Maryland, dedicated to its efforts to develop 10. While the Marine 
Corps does not have a specific 10 doctrine or organization, it sees 10 as larger 
than merely another weapon or tool to be used when appropriate, as something 
that makes the entire range of Marine Corps capabilities and operations more ef-
ficient and effective. Finally, the Air Force has perhaps the most visionary ap-
proach to 10, with several doctrinal publications that e}..l'licitly focus on the 
information realm as an arena for combat and as an operational environment in 
which operations needed to be coordinated with and integrated into those in the 
air and outer space. It, too, has made organizational changes, and was the first 
service to dedicate an organization to the effort, recasting the existing USAF 
Electronic Warfare Center into the Air Force Information Warfare Center 
(AFIWC) in 1993.36 None of these approaches are "right" or "wrong," but they 
do reflect the perspectives of warfare and warfighting held by their originating 
services. While some will see narrow parochialisms at work here, it would be 
more optimistic to think that from these differing perspectives will come a more 
robust, richer and more comprehensive concept for IW and 10 than we have at 
present.37 
In a simpler time, ''joint'' would have meant the four services acting in uni-
son, but that is insufficient for effective 10. Not only are there a range of 
non-service DoD organizations that are critical to the military's ability to wage 
IW, using the previously-cited definition ofIO means that virtually the entire 
apparatus of the federal government is involved in some way with the national 
security exercise of information power. While perhaps only a handful offederal 
organizations would be involved with CNA, others would be involved with 
CNE, and virtually every one with CND, because in the information age every 
organization is increasingly dependent on its electronic and computerized infor-
mation networks for its efficient functioning. One of the most critical, if little-
noticed, segments ofPDD 63 was the tasking of each federal department or 
agency's chiefinformation officer (CIO) with the responsibility for information 
assurance within that organization. This ties into another ofPDD 63's critical 
actions, the assignment of specific segments of the government to work \vith 
their private sector counterparts (Department of Energy with the electric indus-
try, for example) in developing the strategic partnership called for in the docu-
ment. The latest National Security Strategy (December 2000) contains repeated 
references to the critical importance of safeguarding national infrastructures 
from intrusion or attack, whether that attack comes from the physical world or 
viaCNA. 
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While some feel that the US military's interest in IW and 10 is a reflection of a 
peculiar American affinity for technology and the degree in which information 
technology is embedded within our systems and structures, the growing interest 
of the rest of the world indicates that IW 110 is not solely an American issue. 
While this is neither the time nor place to make a detailed exploration of 
non-US perspectives on IW 110, a few examples are in order. The British mili-
tary has been pressing ahead both operationally and educationally, as have most 
of our other English-speaking allies, and their interest has included the pressing 
need to provide CND to counter the threat of CNA against vulnerable infra-
structures.38 Several other governments, including that of Norway, have un-
dertaken specific PCCIP-type studies of their own national infrastructures 
because of the growing awareness that national security, including economic 
health and prosperity, depends on the smooth and confident functioning of 
these computer networks. The Swedish National Defense College (Forsvar-
shogskolan) has integrated 10 into the core of its curricula, and the other Scandi-
navian countries are following suit. The Russian and Chinese perspectives have 
already been cited, albeit too briefly, and the views of one senior Indian national 
security strategist are enlightening. Major General Yashwant Deva recendy 
wrote that the "metaterritorial" nature of IW was blurring the boundary be-
tween peace and war, and he argued that India's national security strategy must 
have an information strategy component to be effective.39 These are perceptive 
insights from a country possessing the world largest "Silicon Valley" and one 
which is a global leader in information technology. Finally, the rapidly increas-
ing use of cyberspace and computer networks for political objectives by 
nongovernmental organizations, whether they be humanitarian groups such as 
the Red Cross, political and environmental activists such as Greenpeace, or rev-
olutionary groups such as the Tamil Eelam (Sri Lanka), Zapatistas (Mexico), or 
Hezbollah (Middle East), poses an interesting problem for governments and su-
pra-national organizations that are uncomfortable working outside of the tradi-
tional and terrestrial boundaries of national security. In cyberspace all actors look 
somewhat alike, and as some recent incidents such as the Solar Sunrise case have 
illustrated, it can be very difficult to determine if the intruder is a lone individual 
or the agent of a State acting for State-sponsored purposes. 
Concluding Thoughts 
Those old enough to remember sayings and slang from the war in Southeast 
Asia may recall one that went "When you're up to your backside in alligators, it's 
kind of hard to remember that your initial mission was to drain the swamp." 
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Right now, in the field ofinfonnation warfare, we are hip-deep in the swamp of 
unresolved issues, and there are a number of alligators circling. At the outset of 
this discussion we faced the Clausewitzian paradigm of warfare, which was based 
in part on the concept that wars are waged by ~'warriors" in service of identifi-
able States. In a postulated paradigm of war by keystroke, are those that operate 
from the keyboards to be considered "warriors?" We have seen examples in 
which young hackers, skilled at moving from database to database via cyber-
space, never physically leaving their keyboards, have been inducted into the 
armed forces of their home countries.40 Could this be used to provide a cadre of 
super-skilled operators who now have the technology of States at their fin-
gertips, instead of what they can afford from Radio Shack? One thinks of the case 
of the Dutch hackers who vainly offered their services to Saddam Hussein during 
the Persian Gulf War. Could such individuals, if acting in the interests and behalf 
of a State, be considered cybennercenaries?41 Equally plausible is the potential for 
them to act on behalf, not of a recognized State, but of some other interest group, 
whether it have political, religious, or even simply monetary motivations. 
Our existing paradigm for war requires kinetic actions, destroying things, or 
crossing physical boundaries with physical objects such as airplanes or tanks. 
What are the political and legal regimes for actions that do not cross the physical 
limits of territorial sovereignty or cause kinetic destruction, but still have serious 
impact on the national security of the "attacked" State? Where are the lines of 
sovereignty in cyberspace, and how does the State respond to the provocations 
and intrusions of what may be a shadowy and virtual opponent? More and more 
of the key infrastructures that support civil society also support, in a strategic 
sense, the military power and capability of the State. Electric grids, oil and gas 
pipelines, transportation networks, and telecommunications are just some of 
those dual-use infrastructures and architectures that support both civil society 
and military strength. Those kinds of assets have been attacked and destroyed in 
wartime before, and they will be again, but what is the impact if the means of ne-
gation comes across the Internet in the forms of bits and bytes? Just as troubling is 
the question of who can and should defend those infrastructures? National 
anned forces protect them against attack by "traditional" military means, but 
does this mission extend into cyberspace? In the United States the answer from 
PDD 63 seems to be that this is a shared public sector-private sector responsibil-
ity that will require the coordination and cooperation of those communities to 
solve the problem of infrastructure vulnerability, but this may not necessarily be 
the answer in other countries that have different political-economic systems and 
traditions. These are just a sample of the questions and issues to be discussed and 
analyzed in the pages of this volume. 
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For more than a century and a half, from the era of Napoleon and Clausewitz, 
to that of strategic bombing and national liberation organizations, western polit-
ical society has had a paradigm of warfare that has focused on the means em-
ployed: force and violence, employed to defeat or destroy the enemy's powers of 
physical resistance. Information "in war" is a continuation of this paradigm, and 
thus-as important as those capabilities are for the capability to employ tradi-
tional military force-is incomplete because of the new capabilities for influ-
ence, power, and the imposition of will offered by the new information 
technologies. Information warfare and information operations do not replace 
the older forms, but they do augment, modifY, and change those forms. The dif-
ference between the terms is important, even vital, and we dare not ignore it, lest 
an adversary who lacks our bureaucratic and intellectual shackles and does not 
"understand our rules" use our very dependence on computer networks to ad-
minister a nasty strategic defeat via the very same environment and metanetwork 
we are so confidendy constructing. 
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